The Great Learning & Doctrine of the Mean
Before
covering Mencius, Xunzi and the Neo-Confucians, it is important to
cover two short texts that became very important for the early and late
Confucians. Both the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean were
chapters of the Book of Rites, one of the five classics Confucius
compiled to be the curriculum of his education system. Zhu Xi, the
central Neo-Confucian who lived 1600 years after Confucius, similarly
created a new four book canon to be used for Confucian education: the
Analects, the Mencius, the Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean.
While the other texts Confucius compiled were studied, these four
formed the new core that would remain the central subject mater of the
government exams in China for 800 years until 1905.
The
Great Learning is a short text attributed in the tradition to
Confucius, followed by commentary attributed to Zengzi, one of
Confucius’ students. Both Mencius and Xunzi were influenced by the text
and its teachings, as both were familiar with not only the Analects but
the five classics Confucius compiled. Wang Yangming, the second most
famous Neo-Confucian who disagreed with Zhu Xi and argued that practice
is essential to and one and the same as learning, did not like Zhu Xi’s
pulling of the Great Learning out of the Book of Rites and giving it
special emphasis.
The most famous quote from the work, the central of three sections, reads:
“The
ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the
world, first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well
their States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate
their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to
cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to
rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts.
Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the
utmost of their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the
investigation of things.
Things being investigated, knowledge became complete.
Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere.
Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified.
Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated.
Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated.
Their families being regulated, their States were rightly governed.
Their States being rightly governed, the entire world was at peace.”
The
Doctrine of the Mean, also translated as the ‘Middle Way’, is another
short chapter of the Book of Rites that teaches to never act in excess
to either side of an opposition but always practice moderation.
Remember that Confucius in the Analects wondered if no one would leave a
room without using the door (with the possible exception of the
Incredible Hulk or the Kool-Aid guy), why people “walk outside the
middle way” in their life practices.
The
text says that the noble, the great person, embodies the course of the
mean, while the crude person acts against the course of the mean, acting
out of balance and ‘to the extreme’. An old translation of the text I
have reads, “The mean (lowercase: hateful) man acts against the course
of the Mean (uppercase: balance), which is needlessly confusing. The
noble are cautious and thus stay balanced, while the crude are hasty and
thus overact. As we will see with Daoism, this is quite in accord with
the Daoist concept of wu-wei, acting less to stay in accord with the
way of things.
Speaking
of the sage-king Shun: “There was Shun. He indeed was truly wise!
Shun loved to question others, and to study their words, though they
might be shallow. he concealed what was bad in them, and displayed what
was good. he took hold of their two extremes, determined the mean, and
employed it in his government of the people. It was by this that he
was Shun!”
The
superior person “cultivates a friendly harmony without being weak”, and
thus is firmly energetic without being overbearing. This is associated
with the principle of reciprocity, which is repeated in the text. It
is then extended to the five relationships, telling us to treat those
above us as we would have those beneath us treat us. We should refrain
both from treating those beneath us with contempt as well as court favor
with those above us. The noble quietly work with their situation,
while the crude look for lucky breaks.
Another
metaphor used is the noble archer, who after missing the target turns
around and examines himself (rather than turning around and saying,
“Somebody coughed” we assume). Psychology experiments have found that
in competition with others when we succeed at tasks we credit ourselves
(internal attribution, looking to the self), and when we fail at tasks
we blame the situation (external attribution, looking outside the self),
but when others succeed at tasks we credit the situation, and when they
fail we blame them. Clearly, the noble have the wisdom to reverse this
initial bias and work on themselves rather than blaming others.
Mencius & Human Nature as Good
Mencius
(370-290 BCE) or Menzi, the second patriarch of Confucianism, believed
that Confucius taught that the human being is basically good and
develops the heart, growing and developing the virtues through love. He
argued that because the human individual is essentially good, we need
ritual to guide our growth but love is the true essence. Xunzi (312 -
230 BCE), the third patriarch of Confucianism, argued against Mencius by
name that the human being is essentially evil and without the rituals
and tradition to hold our nature back and transform us through education
we would be selfish and uncivilized. This remains the major split in
Confucian thought. We can see that there are various views and
contradicting opinions within the system, and that individuals can draw
on Mencius, Xunzi or both to back up their own interpretations of
Confucius.
Mencius
was born in the small warring state of Zou, near to where Confucius was
born and taught. He is sometimes said to have founded Confucianism as
an official school, but like with so many cultural movements there were
followers of Confucius who compiled the Analects before Mencius, and
certainly there were strands of schools that followed Confucius earlier.
Mencius was, however, the primary interpreter of the themes of the
Analects for the Confucian tradition to follow.
A
thousand years later, with Neo-Confucianism, Zhu Xi taught that Mencius
was the last great thinker of the Period of the Hundred Schools and the
patriarch of Confucianism, made the Mencius one of the four books of
Confucian education along with the Analects, and declared Xunzi to be a
heretic for arguing against Mencius. This is the reason that when the
Jesuits got to China 700 years after Zhu Xi and the Neo-Confucian
revival, they latinized Kong Fu Zi as Confucius and Menzi as Mencius but
did not latinize Xunzi. Strangely, though the Jesuits did argue that
Confucius and Mencius were akin to Christianity, they also believed in
the sinful nature of humanity after the Fall of Adam, which is closer to
Xunzi then Mencius.
Like
Confucius, Mencius’ father died when he was very young. Mencius’
mother, who is revered as an ideal example of nurturing motherhood,
famously moved three times with Mencius (known as “Mencius’ mother’s
three moves”) to ensure that her son would be raised in the right
environment. At first they lived near a cemetery, but young Mencius
began impersonating the funeral mourners who were often paid to pretend
to cry and wail. Remember, Confucius thought mourning without grief,
ritual without intent, is the worst thing possible. She moved near a
marketplace, but the boy began imitating the cries of the merchants who
were known as swindlers and deceivers. Confucius was said to have tried
being a merchant, but became disgusted at other merchants who suggested
he fix the balances to make extra money off of rice, beans and other
goods. Finally, she moved near a university so that Mencius would
imitate the scholars and teachers, which he continued to do for the rest
of his life. Also like Confucius, Mencius held moderate government
positions for a short period of time, but became discouraged by the
politics of the time and resumed teaching instead.
Mencius
argued that qi (“chi”, energy) is cultivated through moral practice,
that compassion like any exercise is good for your health. In 2A:6,
Mencius states a major thesis of his work: No one is devoid of
compassion for others. Mencius argues at several points in the book
that we naturally feel for others and their well-being as we do for
ourselves, and that when we fail to care for others there are other
factors involved that block or reverse our natural compassion. Xunzi,
as we will see, is very opposed to this interpretation of Confucius’
thought and argues that compassion must be planted in the human being by
society and study because it is alien and opposite to human nature.
Both agree that when we care for others, we cultivate ourselves (as we
read in the Analects). Mencius believes that compassion is our nature
and just as water naturally goes downward unless it is obstructed by
something humans are naturally compassionate unless matters are
complicated by obstructions. For Xunzi, humans are originally evil and
desirous by nature and require society, education, and the experience of
caring for others to learn to be compassionate.
Mencius
is famous for using the young child falling into a well example to back
up his argument. He argues that anyone would feel panic and fear if
they saw a child in danger, regardless of how evil that individual is or
how twisted they have become. This point is excellent for debate. We
can all imagine someone who is so evil or sociopathic that they would
not care watching a child in serious danger or coming to harm, but is
this common? If it is possible, is it due to obstructions to original
nature, to isolated psychological situations?
Mencius
believes that there are four parts of the human heart that are
developed and cultivated by society and study such that four virtues are
grown like plants, germs or sprouts. The heart is a root system which
grows the virtues of humanity when properly cultivated through education
and practice. The four parts of the heart are compassion (ren) which
sprouts benevolence, shame which sprouts duty and righteousness (yi),
courtesy/modesty which sprouts observance of ritual and principle (li),
and a sense of right and wrong (chih) which sprouts wisdom.
In
3A:5, we see Mencius getting into a battle with a Moist over whether
one should love one’s own family more than others. While compassion is
central to Confucianism, whether or not it is innate like Mencius says
or has to be transplanted like Xunzi says, Confucians believe that one
should have more love for one’s parents, children, family, and country
and that this is the natural and proper way of things. Moists, who are
radical egalitarians, argued against the Confucians that we should love
everyone without distinction, as much as we love ourselves, our parents,
our children, and our country. Confucians argue that the Moists are
breaking with the natural way of the human heart and society, and that
proportion in love is proper and best.
Mencius
argues that we all do naturally love infants and young children and
that this is good. He returns to his well example, and argues that Yi
Zi, a Moist, is taking this one case and applying it improperly to
everyone. Mencius says that the Moist wants us to deny our natural
gradations of love which grow in society while affirming that love is
the true nature of humanity, setting love in opposition to itself and
making love both natural and unnatural at the same time. Mencius argues
that it is both our nature to love everyone and our nature to love
those we are close to more than others, balancing empathy and
transformation with duty and tradition.
Mencius
argues that love and care for others began with early humans, living
before civilization, seeing the decaying bodies of their parents being
attacked by animals. Because humans naturally care for others, and
particularly their parents, they were moved at the sight to bury the
bodies. Note that this makes for proper burial, the topic of the debate
with Yi Zi. Indeed, archeology today recognizes the birth of culture
and civilization in the increasingly ritualized burial of the dead, who
are increasingly ornamented and buried with items which were precious to
the individual and possibly useful in the afterlife or next life. Yi
Zi concedes the point and accepts that love starts with the love one has
for one’s parents and develops from there, but presumably still
believes that this initial love for family should be cultivated into
caring equally for all humanity. In Chinese philosophical texts, there
are often instances of a member of an opposing school (sometimes quite
famous) conceding in argument to the author of the text, showing us the
rich tradition of debate between various schools in Chinese thought.
With Daoism, we will see that even Confucius is made to accept defeat
and concede superiority to the Daoists several times in the text of
Zhuang Zi.
In
4A:12, Mencius elaborates and says that goodness starts with working on
the self and love for one’s parents, and moves outward from there to
one’s friends and the whole of one’s society. Thus, he agrees with Yi
Zi the Moist that one should cultivate a love for all of humanity, but
still thinks it improper to lose all reverence and distinction
particular to one’s family, friends, and culture.
In
4A:16, Mencius considers another example famous in Confucian
scholarship for its implications. A scholar (school unknown) poses a
problem to Mencius: it says in the laws that it is improper for men and
women to touch hands if they are not married, but if your brother’s
sister is drowning, shouldn’t you reach out to save her? Mencius
replies that it is proper to save her, and that one must not blindly
follow the law but use discretion given the situation. This passage is
famous, because Confucians are big on observing law and ritual but
sometimes one must break the law. Confucius said in the Analects that
even though the rites say to use a silk hat, it is OK to use a hemp hat
instead because it is more modest. He also tells his students to rise
up and overthrow an unjust tyrant. The scholar debating Mencius says
the empire is now drowning, implying that they should radically break
with the laws, traditions and government to save society. Mencius
replies that upholding law and ritual is the way to save society and so
the example of the drowning sister-in-law does not justify a radical
break from tradition. Remember that this was during the Warring States
Period. Mencius is arguing that restoring the old Zhou ways would be
the solution, like Confucius believed, while the scholar seems to
suggest a radical change in social structure, like the Moists argued.
As we will see soon Moists believed that all property should be used in
common and everyone live in common as one family.
In
4B:12, Mencius says the great person retains the heart of a child. A
Moist might point out the previous battle with Yi Zi and say Mencius is
going against what he has said before if a child is all loving and
completely open. Mencius might counter that retaining the child heart
will naturally grow into its arrangements while being pure and absolute,
in the same way that children naturally love their parents and those
with whom they are familiar.
In
4B:13, Mencius says that following one’s parents when they are alive is
good, but following them after they are dead is greater and shows that
one is truly cultivated and a noble person. Xun Zi might be cynical
here, because if you applied this to society he would argue that without
society one would tend not to be good at all and that the one who
follows the ways of one’s parents after they are dead does so only
because society still surrounds them. He would likely agree with
Mencius, however, that this would demonstrate one was truly cultivated
and transformed by society.
In
6A:2, as in several other places, Mencius likens love and human nature
(which he believes to be identical) to water and argues that just as
water naturally moves downward love naturally moves outward. If water
does not move downward, it is blocked by something. In the same way, if
a human being is not loving towards others and compassionate, it is
blocked by something. As seen, this love would grow outward naturally
but equally would radiate in differentiated levels. Love for those
close would be greater then love for those far, but love for those close
and love for those far would mutually support and increase each other.
In
6A:7, Mencius speaks of sowing barley on various ground (strikingly
similar to the parable of Jesus, which must have astounded the Jesuits
along with the Gold and Silver rules of reciprocity). Just as when
barley does not grow the seeds have fallen on bad soil, when humans are
bad it is not because they do not have love and goodness in their nature
but because they are put in a bad situation. Recall Mencius’ mother
repeatedly seeking a better environment for the cultivation of her
child. Reason and goodness are common to all. The sage or great person
simply recognizes this and grows what all have to become great.
Xunzi & Human Nature as Evil
Xunzi
(in the older Wade-Giles, Hsun Tzu), the third most important Confucian
after Confucius and Mencius, studied and taught at a university in the
state of Chi. Like Confucius and Mencius, he briefly held a government
position until his patron was assassinated, then returned to teaching.
He had many followers in his day, some of whom are said to have used
his teachings in the service of Legalism, which strangely sought to have
Confucianism banned when supported by the Chin and then was banned by
the Confucian supporting Han in turn. Unlike Confucius and Mencius, he
did not travel widely. Also, unlike the Analects and Mencius, his text
is his own, not a set of anecdotes and sayings collected by followers.
Thus it is more systematic and contains entire arguments at length.
Xunzi
argued that human nature is evil because human nature is desire.
Common to human thought accross all cultures is the frame of desire and
hate as the lower selfish part of our nature and reason and love as the
higher compassionate part of our nature. While Mencius argues that we
naturally are the upper and it is merely obstructed by the lower when we
are evil, Xunzi argues that we naturally are the lower and it is only
through cultivation that we develop the upper. Are either singularly
human nature? Regardless, there is a common theme that we only come to
be fulfilled in the way desire tries through developing reason and love,
which truly satisfy.
Like
Mencius, Xunzi argued that anyone in the street can become a sage, but
it depends on environment and effort. If one hangs out with foolish
people, one will be foolish, and likewise if you stick to the wise and
read the wisdom of great books you will become wise. While we are not
originally good according to Xunzi, we have the capacity to become good
even when it does not yet exist. Much like Mencius’ barley sewing
analogy but distinct, Xunzi would see the seed sewed not as the original
heart and nature but as external education and civilization, while the
original nature would be the soil, devoid of the seed but capable of
sustaining growth.
Xunzi
argues that without society and laws people would grab for themselves
and do nothing for others. Like Hobbes, the English political
philosopher, argues that this justifies the king acting any way the king
sees fit, including killing his subjects, in the name of the good and
safety of the entire people. He was also a pragmatist, arguing that
laws, morals and rulers are tools to be used for the cultivation and
happiness of people. It is this part of his philosophy which may well
have been supported by the Legalists.
In
Improving Yourself (Section 2 of the Xunzi), he argues that if we stick
to the rituals and laws our behavior will be good and if we abandon the
rituals and laws it will be bad. He draws openly on the behavior of
civilized nobles vs. the behavior of poor country folk to back this up.
He will draw a similar distinction between children and adults.
Clearly, Xunzi is a city boy. While Daoists saw the common country
people as exemplary of virtue, Xunzi sees them as course and uncultured.
As an aside, this is strangely like the civilized vs. barbarian view
many Chinese have had for thousands of years of South East Asian people,
as well as Cantonese Chinese from Hong Kong have of the Mandarin
Chinese from mainland China today. Clearly this is a very human
problem.
Xunzi
argues that one’s temperament and intelligence need to be in balance
and if they get overgrown they will cause ruin. This is very much in
line with the Doctrine of the Mean or Middle Way found in the Analects
and the text. Human abilities need to be reined in by society and
customs, or they will cause problems. He argues that only by following
laws can one be liberal and compassionate. Compassion is the goal that
is possible, but it cannot be achieved without laws and principles.
Following one’s parents and teachers is necessary for human
development. Confucius says in the Analects that learning without
thinking is bad, but thinking without learning is dangerous. Xunzi is
likely thinking of this very passage.
In
Man’s Nature is Evil (Section 23 of the Xunzi), he opens with this
thesis and states that all goodness is the result of growth and effort.
People naturally desire. They must work and change to understand that
they only get what they desire when they put their desires in check, and
they only learn this through involvement with society and its laws.
Freud argued very similarly about sexual impulse, and that all
technology is sexuality denied and deferred into work. The first
paragraph lays this out succinctly.
Xunzi
openly refers to Mencius by name and his theory that human nature is
good and says that Mencius is wrong. Xunzi argues that Mencius is
confusing human nature with the results of conscious human activity and
development. Xunzi believes that the early legendary sage kings created
society because they realized that human nature is corrupt and they
created a method for us to grow from our nature and become excellent in
spite of it. Some argued against this by asking how the great sage
kings could have created a just society if one did not yet exist, to
which Xunzi replied that they had reached a level of cultivation such
that they could then transform society profoundly.
While
Mencius teaches to look inside ourselves to find morality, Xunzi
teaches to look outside ourselves, to both society and the cosmos. The
sage kings looked outside of themselves not only to great texts and
social arrangements, but to the order of the universe to develop
themselves. Xunzi is more cosmological than both Confucius and Mencius,
speaking of the orders of nature and base but can potentially develop
to be great like a society or the cosmos. In one passage, Xunzi argues
that fire and water have energy but no awareness, and that animals have
energy and awareness but no morality, but humans have energy, awareness
and the capacity to develop discrimination of right from wrong and
morality. They develop this by looking outward and learning, not by
looking inward which will only stunt growth and keep us in an immature
and desirous state. It is making distinctions that makes us greater
than beasts, and the rituals and traditions that are the greatest
distinctions passed down from the sage kings.
Xunzi
argues that the example of child-like love Mencius employs is
misleading. Children do not know enough, are not developed enough, to
refrain from grabbing for themselves. Good people restrain their own
desires to be good to others, unlike the child. Note that we tell
people to be like a little child (when happy & loving) and we also
tell people to NOT be like a little child (when angry & upset).
While children are innocent, and when happy adorable, it is true that
they do not have the ability to care for others and support others that
the developed adult has, and if a desire or negativity gets in their way
they quickly lose all focus.
Xunzi
argues that greatness IS an object of desire, and the great person
realizes/desires to overcome desire and discipline desire to truly
fulfill desire. This seems paradoxical, but true to life. Modern
psychology experiments have shown that children who learn to control
their desires and defer pleasure with patience are more successful later
in life in their achievements. The achievements satisfy the person
more than the initial lesser things desired.
If
Mencius is right, Xun Zi argues, we could dispense with society and be
good in the state of nature. Both the Daoists and Rousseau the European
political philosopher hold this to be true. Xun Zi is arguing that, if
we believe Mencius, we may as well all become Daoists. If we honor the
sages and the good over the stupid and the evil, we do so because of
how much each has developed and not because of their universal nature.
Xun Zi is arguing that, if we believe Mencius, we may as well all
become Moists.
Xun
Zi argues that all human beings are equal in their capacity to become
good and develop, but they do not start out good. The sage is one who
has developed, not the one who remains the same as they were in the
beginning. Xun Zi argues that because one has two feet, one can
theoretically walk to the ends of the earth but no one has so far
managed to do so. The famous bows (for arrows), leaders and horses all
became famous for how they were cultivated and developed and were not
excellent without conscious effort and process.
He
ends by saying twice: “Environment is the important thing!” Remember
Mencius agrees in speaking of sowing barley. For Confucians, society is
essential. The debate is on whether the environment compliments or
contradicts human nature.
One
last passage I want to site, particularly to fight against the view
that ancient Greek and modern European thought is distinctly scientific
or rational, says: “Those who are good at discussing antiquity must
demonstrate the validity of what they say in modern times; those who are
good at discussing Heaven (the way of things) must show proofs from the
human world. In discussions of all kinds, men value what is in accord
with the facts and what can be proved to be valid. Hence if a man sits
on his mat propounding some theory, he should be able to stand right up
and put it into practice, and show that it can be extended over a wide
area with equal validity. Now Mencius states that man’s nature is good,
but this is neither in accord with the facts, nor can it be proved to
be valid.”
Neo-Confucianism, Zhu Xi & Wang Yang Ming
About
1100 CE, during the Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279 CE), Confucianism merged
with Daoist and Buddhist ideas to form a Confucian revival called
Neo-Confucianism by scholars today. Buddhism, including both Chan and
Pure Land schools, had flourished during the Tang (618 - 907 CE). Most
of the great masters and their koan encounters had happened during this
period, and then the koan collections such as the Blue Cliff Record were
collected and codified during the Sung. The Neo-Confucians sought to
take the flagging Confucian orthodoxy and put it once again at the
center of education and society after losing ground to Buddhism for five
hundred years. Buddhist metaphors such as the pearl at the bottom of
the muddy lake and the sun emerging from behind the clouds, as well as
Daoist concepts, were reinterpreted in light of Confucianism, giving
them an active educational and moral interpretation.
The
Cheng Brothers, Cheng Hao (1032 - 1085 CE) and Cheng Yi (1033 - 1107)
were two philosophers, teachers and officials whose work and schools led
to the Neo-Confucian revival. Together with Zhu Xi, the central
systematiser of Neo-Confucianism who was deeply influenced by and
indebted to the Cheng brothers’ work, the three are considered the
founders of Neo-Confucianism in the Sung. Their father was a county
detective in Huangpi of central-east China. The two brothers were known
also as Cheng the Elder and Chang the Younger, even though Cheng Hao
was only one year older than Cheng Yi. Cheng Hao was known for being
happy and laid back, while Cheng Yi was strict and uptight.
Both
brothers believed in Li, which as mentioned in Chinese Buddhism was now
not simply tradition, principle and ritual but cosmic and identified
and equated with the Dharma of Buddhism and the Dao of Daoism. Both
identified Li with physical form and purpose, beyond ritual and
tradition, just as the Buddha’s teaching and Daoist sage’s way of living
were identified with the law of the universe. The elder laid back
Cheng Hao founded the School of Mind, arguing that Li was psychological,
while the younger uptight Cheng Yi founded the School of Law, arguing
that Li was physical. This split is along the classic lines of
dogmatism, truth as objective, and skepticism, truth as subjective.
Much like in the work of Plato and Neo-Platonism of medieval Europe,
the Cheng Brothers saw Li, form, combined with Qi (“chi”), energy, as
the composition of all things. The noble and the sages seek the forms
of things,
Zhu
Xi (1130-1200 CE), also known as Zhuzi or Master Zhu, was the
systematiser who took the work of the Cheng Brothers and others and
created the educational system of China that lasted almost 600 years
from 1313 to 1905. He was taught in the lineage of Cheng Yi and the
School of Law, and argued that Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, the
three great Chinese traditions, were teaching the same truth but that
Confucius was the superior and primary teacher. Like Confucius, he
gathered a small canon of four books to be the foundation of education:
the Analects of Confucius, the Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean, and
the Great Learning. Zhu Xi put a very heavy emphasis on reading and
study, particularly re-reading the right books again and again to
understand the essence of morality and principle.
Wang
Yang Ming (1470 – 1530 CE) one of the most revered Neo-Confucians, was
famous for the idea of the unity of knowledge and action. He was
opposed to Zhu Xi, who he argued put too much emphasis on study and not
enough on integrating knowledge with action and practice, without which
it is not genuine knowledge. While Confucius taught that intention and
action are distinct things, Wang Yang Ming taught the complementary
truth that the two are interactive as one whole. It is true that they
are different, but this should not distract from their unity and
complementary nature.
While
someone can say that they know something, we can judge whether they
truly know or not by how they act. Two examples he uses are knowing
that a color is beautiful and knowing that a smell is bad. To see a
beautiful color and to feel pleasure are one and the same, the seeing
corresponding to mind and investigation and the feeling corresponding to
body and action. If someone says they know that a smell is bad, but
they do not act like it is bad (gagging, opening a window, pointing at
their younger sibling), we could say that they do not really know that
the smell is bad but only saying the smell is bad. Wang Yangming argues
that if someone’s nose is stuffed up, they can be told there is a bad
smell but they do not know there is unless they react to it. In the
same way, if we know someone is a good person we do not get nervous
around them or hide our valuables when they come over. If we did, it
could be said that we do not truly know they are good because we do not
act like they are trustworthy.
Wang
Yangming is arguing against Zhu Xi’s teaching that reading and study
are central. If one does not act well and put morality into practice,
mere reading and recitation is not true knowledge but nothing more than
“ghosts and shadows”. Notice how similar this is to Buddhist metaphors.
Wang Yangming, unlike Zhu Xi, is closer to Cheng Hao than Cheng Yi,
arguing that all things are mind, also similar to Buddhism. In his day,
Wang Yangming was accused of being a crypto-Buddhist and corrupting
Confucianism, though in fact Zhu Xi and others were borrowing from
Buddhism and Daoism, if less overtly.
